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COMMERCIAL PEACE AND POLITICAL




This article examines the mixed effect of arbitration upon the
generation of international law norms; in particular, how arbitration
can generate private law norms so effectively and yet still face strong
resistance in public international law processes and controversies.
The work of arbitration for international commercial litigation has
been nothing less than spectacular.1 In both the private international
and domestic civil contexts, arbitration has provided viable remedial
solutions and functional adjudication when the law was either non-
existent or incapacitated.2 It has supplied a workable and adaptable
trial system, which-on the international side-could also generate
substantive legal norms.3 Arbitration thereby has redressed the fail-
*Orlando Distinguished Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson School of Law
1. There has been an explosion of interest and writing on the topic of international com-
mercial arbitration. One source lists nearly one thousand websites on various issues in the field
of international arbitration. See International Council for Commercial Arbitration, Directory of
Arbitration Websites and Information on Arbitration Available Online, www.arbitration-
icca.org/directoryof__arbitration website.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2007). See also Charlotte L.
Bynum's Research Guide, International Commercial Arbitration, http://library.lawschool.corne-
ll.edu/WhatWeDo/ResearchGuides/Intl-Comnmercial-Arbitration.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008);
Georgetown Law Library International Commercial Arbitration Research Guide,
http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/intl/guides/arbitration/ (last visited May 15, 2008); Gloria Miccioli,
International Commercial Arbitration, in ASIL GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC RESOURCES FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Kelly Vinopal ed., 2007), http://www.asil.org/resource/arbl.htm (last
visited Apr. 8, 2008); Catherine Morris, International and Domestic Commercial Arbitration, in
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND PEACEBUILDING: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY,
www.peacemakers.calbibliography/biblOarbitration.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2008); Jean M.
Wenger, Update to International Commercial Arbitration: Locating the Resources (May 24,
2004), www.llrx.com/features/arbitration2.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
2. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION (2d
ed. 2007); ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (4th ed. 2004).
3. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 773, 804 (2002); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1183,
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ings of sovereign politics and adversarial justice,4 achieving its great-
est success in circumstances dominated by a commercial ethos.'
Arbitration, however, cannot transcend the essential character of
the disputes submitted to it. The nature of sovereign relations makes
resolution of political disputes exceedingly difficult through any
mechanism. Although private commercial parties seek final and
binding determinations, States do not. States do not respond to
transactional imperatives. They engage in the politics of sovereign
autonomy and political independence. They demand adjustments
and accommodations even when a law proclaims their culpability. No
matter how distinguished and how steeped in gravitas, a private arbi-
tral tribunal's orders to the leader of a sovereign nation-State are
unlikely to have practical or coercive effect, unless the marketplace
and the entire global political community sustains the determina-
tions.' The rule of law is less stable and is more difficult to maintain
in political relations among States than in commercial transactions
between private parties.7
1206 (2004). See also LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW
MERCHANT (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., rev. ed. 1998).
4. See generally Howard M. Holtzmann, Arbitration: An Indispensable Aid to Multina-
tional Enterprise, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 337 (1975); Henry P. de Vries, International Commer-
cial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42 (1982).
5. See, e.g., RENE DAVID, L'ARBITRAGE DANS LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (1982).
6. International isolation, disapproval, or sanctions may not be enough to achieve the en-
forcement of ordinary adjudicatory results against States. Even a comprehensive consensus
within the global community can be thwarted institutionally by a single vote in the UN Security
Council. Because the ICJ judgments have no means of coercive enforcement, they cannot result
in the coercive imposition of liability against the defendant State. See Francesco Francioni, In-
ternational 'Soft Law': A Contemporary Assessment, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 167 (Vaughn Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996). The proclamation
of liability against the injuring State is merely one of the many steps in creating a setting and
framework for possible, eventual resolution.
Inter-State conflicts are always in a process of tentative adjustment, and parties must
wait for circumstances to yield the right setting for resolution. Circumstances are complex, vari-
able, and unpredictable. The political will must exist to reach an outcome of the conflict. For
example, ICSID awards against Argentina will be enforceable only if the domestic political au-
thorities conclude that their interests are served by the concession to liability. That conclusion
is potentially dependent upon an enormous number of variables-past, immediate, and future.
Similarly, the ICJ's declaration that Iran's taking of American hostages at the U.S. Embassy was
illegal under international law will have tittle, if any, impact upon the development of U.S.-Iran
relations. The difficult political relations between the two States involve a multiplicity of fac-
tors-from anti-Semitism and domestic politics to regional competition and economic interests
capped off by religious sectarianism and intolerance. Even a change of regime may not favora-
bly alter the relationship.
7. The finality and the stability achieved by the rule of law are optimal goals for commer-
cial and other private transactions. For the vast majority of private parties, the ability to have
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Nonetheless, arbitration has achieved impressive results in the
resolution of diplomatics and foreign investment disputes. 9 The future
development of these sectors of arbitral activity depends upon the
will of the parties and the evolution, often precarious, of political re-
lations in the affected area and among the implicated States. While
the reach of arbitration has become multi-dimensional, the irreduci-
ble difference between the types of disagreements produced by politi-
cal and commercial activity remains. In disputes that incorporate
elements of both categories, the success or failure of arbitration as a
resolutory process will vary according to which element predominates
in the circumstances. Generally, the more commercial the political
controversy, the more likely arbitration is to provide a suitable solu-
tion.m
your day in court and to make your case constitutes a sufficient opportunity at civilized resolu-
tion. State parties do not share this perspective. The disposition of disputes by outside third
parties may have some relevance, but is extremely unlikely to provide a dispositive end. An-
tagonisms and conflicts are the lifeblood of political relations. The political parties are unlikely
to delegate conclusive authority to someone else; the quid pro quo of turmoil is to capture and
maintain control and to force the other party to accede to your demands. Disputes of whatever
kind can lead (sometimes readily) to war. Political rule is a matter of being victorious through
force. On this topic, see Thomas Buergenthal, The Proliferation of Disputes, Dispute Settlement
Procedures and Respect for Rule of Law, 21 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 126 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Henri C. Alvarez, Arbitration Under the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, 16 ARB. INT'L 393 (2000); Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its
Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1416 (2003); David A. Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute Reso-
lution under NAFTA's Chapter 20: A Commentary on the Process, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 481,
484 (2000); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The U.S.-Iranian Dispute Settlement Accords: An Arbitrator
Looks at the Prospects for Arbitration, 36 ARB. J. 3 (1981); Michael P. Malloy, The Iran Crisis:
Law under Pressure, 3 WIS. INT'L L.J. 15. (1984).
9. See Georges R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 23 (Julian D. M. Lew ed., 1987); Nagla Nassar, Internationali-
zation of State Contracts: ICSID, The Last Citadel, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 185 (1997); LuCY REED ET
AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION (2004).
10. Foreign investment in developing or re-emerging States generally involves standard
commercial operations and well-settled contract provisions. Unless the foreign enterprises sup-
ply security or military training, facilities, or products, they provide infrastructure or natural re-
source development. The exercise of foreign commercial control over indigenous patrimonial
interests and the profitability of such projects make them highly susceptible of criticism by the
party in opposition or of reversal by the host government. The winds of political discontent and
eventual opposition are easy to launch in this setting. The passion and irrationality of political
debate often lead to arbitrary and ill-conceived policies, causing substantial harm and loss to the
foreign investor. Once communications break down and the dispute hardens, it may be difficult
to retrieve the situation and gain compensation for the losses suffered. In fact, the latter may
not be obtainable without some form of political intervention by the investor's home State. Po-
litical representation and espousal of claims, however, are exceedingly unlikely. If the relation-
ship cannot be salvaged, private insurance may be the only recourse. At this point, the attrib-
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A business dispute about who pays for a commercial loss can be
significant and complex and may necessitate intricate adjudicatory
procedures."' The difficulty of commercial disputes pales in compari-
son to a dispute between a Western corporation about the future dis-
tribution of profits from the commercialization of a natural resource
in an emerging country.'2 A business dispute that arises in volatile
and intense political circumstances is no longer a standard contract
claim. As a result, it is less susceptible to arbitral adjudication or any
other form of resolution.
ORIGINS AND CHARACTER OF INTER-STATE RELATIONS
When asked to account for the proliferation of war, conflict, and
instability in the world, a scientist once explained that the human race
was an "aggressive species."" Contemporary events such as the ter-
rorist strikes on 9/11, genocide in Sudan, and "ethnic cleansing" in the
former Yugoslavia amply validate the observation. Even nature is
inhospitable to humanity, as demonstrated particularly by the Black
Death in the Middle Ages, and AIDS and influenza pandemics in
contemporary society.14 The physical universe itself is governed by
forces that demonstrate an indifference to, even a complete unaware-
ness of, the human species and its welfare.
Though the brief history of the United States is marked by
armed conflict,'5 humanity's warring instinct is hardly unique to U.S.
history or foreign policy, or even to the 2 0 1h or 21't centuries. The
1400-year reign of the Roman Emperors was founded upon bellicose
utes of an ordinary commercial relationship seem far removed from the transactional circum-
stances.
11. Arbitration is not simple-minded adjudication, and commercial litigation can be pro-
tracted and intricate. Commercial disputes are more susceptible of resolution than their politi-
cal counterparts because of the values that prevail in these transactions and the nature of busi-
ness interests and activities. Despite the quest for competitive edge and the infliction of various
disappointments, achieving a final resolution of the conflict that makes business sense and en-
ables the parties to move forward is the primary objective.
12. Many of the current ICSID cases involve such circumstances. See Jean Kalicki, ICSID
Arbitration in the Americas, in ARBITRATION REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS 2007 3 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/ICSID%20arbitration%20in%20the-
%20Americas.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,2008).
13. ANTHONY STORR, HUMAN AGGRESSION, intro. (1968).
14. Earthquakes, tidal waves, and hurricanes also attest to the many natural catastrophes
that can, and do, befall humanity.
15. The warring history of the United States started with the Revolution and the Civil War
and continued with the two World Wars, the Korean and Vietnam Conflicts, and the present-
day engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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imperial politics and the development of increasingly deadly and effi-
cient instruments of war. Leaders such as Alexander the Great, Gen-
ghis Khan, Charlemagne, Ivan the Terrible, and to a lesser extent Na-
poleon, also achieved legendary status through belligerence and
subjugation. 6 As these examples demonstrate, aggression may well
be the chief defining characteristic of the collective human personal-
ity. Humanitarianism is generally an afterthought, ordinarily linked
to religious obligation, and practiced by organizations with little, if
any, political standing.17 Once they emerge and become stable, hu-
man societies tend to look beyond their borders and espouse con-
quest as the means of acquiring greater territory and available re-
sources. Conquest also assuages anxieties about possible vulnerability
to attack.18 Human beings are innately competitive and insecure; they
are challenged by the mere presence of others, and these emotions
tend to breed nearly intrinsic aggression. 9
16. The most disturbed political leaders have inflicted enormous pain on their fellow hu-
man beings in a quest for proverbial world domination, no matter how elusive and illusory that
objective has always proven to be. Individual freedom and personal development are distinctly
inconsequential as compared to survival when these leaders become dictators pursuing a grand
mission. The acts of Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, and Mao and, to a lesser extent, Osama Bin Laden,
Hugo Chavez, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are recent examples of the inhumanity to which
unrequited needs and aberrant political views can give rise. Although they represent more so-
ber and rational calculations, the arms race and the international sale of weaponry also fuel the
campaign for contemporary supremacy and posthumous recognition. They, too, exploit insecu-
rities. They feed aggression, greed, and paranoid ambition and allow these character flaws to
parade as a means of protecting national security, preserving cultural integrity and achieving
historical equity among societies. In the nuclear age, civilization will remain vital and humanity
will continue (and even prosper) as long as hate is tempered and lunatic beliefs eradicated. In-
dividual demise is inevitable and unavoidable, but death at a collective level is a truly unaccept-
able outcome.
17. See, e.g., TAYLOR B. SEYBOLT, HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE (2007); Global Policy Forum, Humanitarian Interven-
tion? Empire?, www.globalpolicy.org/empire/humanint/index.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). To
illustrate the point further, both the International Chamber of Commerce (www.iccwbo.org)
and the International Bar Association (www.iba.org) were founded in the aftermath of the
Great War. Their purpose was to avoid another similar conflagration. While both institutions
developed successfully in many respects, their laudable objective was obviously not realized.
18. Human beings, in effect, are impelled by variable and contradictory tendencies. They
need to form families and to establish social architectures for satisfying basic needs. These posi-
tive propensities, however, are accompanied by an equally strong desire to destroy or appropri-
ate the same foundational structures in other groups.
19. Indeed, both collectively and individually, the human personality is beset by emotional
pathologies. See HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY (Robert Hogan et al. eds., 1997).
Conflicted psychological dispositions make the use of force by human beings irrational, exag-
gerating its necessity and intensity and often transforming it into a bloodlust. The distortion of
reality afflicts both the leaders and members of human societies. It is endemic in human beings
to be plagued by feelings of dissatisfaction and a sense of void. Life appears simultaneously to
2008]
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History also teaches that human beings are most irretrievably
committed to, and willing to fight about, abstract beliefs such as reli-
gious or political convictions. With the exception of the ancient
world, human societies often unilaterally and coercively seek to im-
pose their inalterable views of divinity upon others. When others re-
ject our beliefs, we are particularly threatened because these beliefs
are acquired early in life, and have become fundamental existential
tenets and part of our psychological core." At a community level, the
strength of these beliefs is demonstrated in the emotions that sur-
round rituals and traditions that constitute society's cultural persona.
Disagreements about the place and significance of iconic manifesta-
tions are likely to be vehement and can readily escalate and explode,
and may also express other, more political, ideological, or economic
antipathies and antagonisms. Political rhetoric can cloak the underly-
ing motivation for aggression and make it appear more justified. In
many respects, "plausible deniability" is the ultimate political maneu-
ver or "trick."
Thus, the historical expression of the human personality estab-
lishes the political relations among States. Politics represents a
merger of the human warring instinct with belief systems and emo-
tional dispositions. The often-intoned supplications for peace and
harmony remain unfulfilled entreaties and rhetorical reflexes in hu-
manity's political experience. Competitiveness, insecurity, and ag-
gression not only bring us to engage in murderous practices, but also
to the brink of self-extinction. Battles about sovereignty, territory,
cultural or religious beliefs, and basic necessities trace the "flat-line"
progression of humanity through time." The conflicts are ordinarily
intractable, compulsively repeated, and completely resistant to effec-
tive resolution. If it is attempted at all, dispute resolution is generally
lengthy, riddled with obdurate positions, and filled with suspicions
and calumnies. The process involves unyielding and uncompromising
contests of self-interest. Therefore, though it is frequently and gener-
be purposeful and purposeless. The anxiety of existence is quelled by constant efforts to outdo
death by leaving an immortal legacy or at least by becoming so preoccupied with temporal am-
bitions that mortality is forgotten or recedes into the background. Historical figures are re-
membered, revered, or reviled by people who never knew them or lived with them. Even im-
mortality is an impersonal imagery and good only until the next epoch emerges from a celestial
cataclysm.
20. Because it takes great effort, pain, and time to assess, question, and adjust basic beliefs,
rational reconsideration of beliefs is generally ignored.
21. The best contemporary illustration is the apparently endless quest to achieve peace and
stability in the Middle East, the so-called Arab-Israeli Conflict.
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ously described as the "art of the possible, 22 politics is far from being
the highest expression of human development. It borrows much from
the base and instinctual human personality.
THE CHOICE BETWEEN INSTINCT AND REASON
Fear, insecurity, and the need to establish control by domination
are akin to untamed nature and the mechanical operation of the
physical universe. They are estranged from the use of reason and un-
affected by the right of choice possessed by free beings. They take
place automatically and inevitably, as a result of fixed and irresistible
patterns. This natural determinism can be overcome or, at least, sub-
dued by human reason. Understanding is humanity's most redemp-
tive attribute because it provides a means by which the species can be
salvaged, maintain its existence, and even acquire a level of success.
Plainly, human existence consists of a constant pull between reason
and instinct. Comprehending the express and underlying meaning of
circumstances, the interests at play, and the costs of accomplishment
or of the lack of accomplishment can engender enlightened and intel-
ligent action and more desirable and durable outcomes. Prescient in-
sight can lead to magnanimity, constructive policies, and rational
practices, allowing humanity to escape its destructive instincts and
avoid its own progressive annihilation.
Dispute resolution is constructed on the same dynamic. Cardozo
once described the act of judging as intermediating between history,
social needs, practical consequences, long-standing legal rules, and
basic fairness.23 A true judgment or decision cannot be rendered
without a meaningful understanding of these inter-related factors.
Reconciliation and accommodation of conflicting interests in order to
produce consensus do not imply surrender to mediocrity or abdica-
tion of principle. Rather, consensus-building establishes a founda-
tional platform upon which human resourcefulness and adaptability
can advance the ends of civilization. A lucid understanding of the de-
ficiencies and expanse of human personality and the emergence and
dynamics of conflict is a necessary first step to creating the stability
that leads to civilization.
Making a conflict adversarial has the opposite effect. It has the
same impact as politicizing a conflict. Polarization sets in almost in-
stantly. Reasonableness and rationality are replaced by a strident and
22. Quote attributed to Otto von Bismark.
23. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
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uncompromising desire to win, essentially at any cost. Any conces-
sion or possible lack of determination to win is seen as weakness.
Mixed considerations are confusing; unequivocal positions are con-
vincing. Truth is not a limitation on argumentation-"spinning"
propositions and deluding the decision-maker are the real objectives
of advocacy. Adversarial dialogue represents, in effect, a declaration
of war. The stakes and interests at issue are the same as in a military
confrontation; victory and peace are synonymous. Trials are based
upon aggression, the intensity of which is exacerbated by the oppos-
ing parties' insecurity and apprehension that the other side might be
stronger and more likely to triumph. Controlling perceptions, no
matter how deceptive and false the result, is the primary goal of the
confrontation.
Adversarialism not only dominates the system of trial, but also is
present to varying degrees in political debate, journalism,24 and educa-
tion in American society. 5 The introduction of an adversarial ele-
24. Generally, adversarialism extinguishes the informational function of news reporting.
For example, Michael Barone, a senior writer for U.S. News & World Report, asserts that 90%
of journalists in the United States are Democrats. Michael Barone, The News Media, REAL
CLEAR POLITICS, Apr. 3, 2006, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/04/the-news me-
dia.html. Fox News buttresses its claim of being "fair and balanced" with its hiring patterns.
According to Barone, 65% of the Fox News journalists are Republicans. Mr. Barone illustrates
the taint in the news media (and also, I would argue, in the schools) by relating an anecdote.
Speaking with a CBS News executive, Barone alleged that the news media was biased because
of its overwhelming Democrat affiliation. The executive responded that, although the tilt was
undeniable, journalists were professionally objective. Replying, Barone asserted that, if journal-
ists functioned without regard to their personal political beliefs, why not hire Republicans? The
executive made manifest the depth of his ideological conviction and leanings by responding that
news reporting would then be biased. See Michael Barone, Happy birthday; the new media, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 2, 2006, http://www.usnews.com/blogs/barone/2006/8/2/happy-
birthday-the-new-media.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008). The selection and presentation of
"news" topics are twisted and tailored to express the partiality underlying the conveying of
facts. It is more important to manipulate and mislead the public than inform it.
25. Today, some "politicized" schools began to stand between students and parents on the
basis of social policy issues. For example, a middle school in Maine dispensed contraception to
twelve and thirteen year olds without parental consent or notification. Maine middle school to
offer birth control, CNN, www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/10/18/middleschool.contraception.ap/in-
dex.html (last visited March 25, 2008). Ironically, these schools feared developing independent
minds capable of analyzing reality and reaching their own conclusions, thereby creating their
own sense of values. Although the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union
exposed the historical fallacy of communism, many of the blunt and intrusive tactics of the de-
funct empire have been introduced and are practiced in this country. These educational en-
claves substitute counseling and "appropriate" behaviors for the competition of academic
achievement and distinction, just like Soviet courts would command ordinary citizens to attend
so-called trials to experience and benefit from their socialist teachings. See Tait Trussel, Politi-
cal Correctness Suppresses Education, available at www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=6460 (last
visited March 25, 2008); Augustin Blazquez and Jaums Sutton, Political Correctness: The
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ment into these fields degrades their integrity and the outcomes they
yield. When it engages in adversarialism, humanity, although adorned
in the garb of sophistication, is only a few steps removed from its
primitive origins; conquest and the acquisition of advantage are the
sole purpose of the exchange.
THE LIBERALITY OF COMMERCE
In his celebrated lectures on "The Western Tradition, 26 the late
Professor Eugene Weber described the gradual rise in Europe of the
mercantile and financial communities between the 141h and 1 7 th centu-
Scourge of Our Times, www.archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/4/4/121115.shtml (last
visited March 25, 2008); Anita Vogel, Textbook Change Draws Charges of Political Correctness,
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,85594,00.html (last visited March 25, 2008); THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 35,53 (1989).
In some schools, adopting "correct" values is far more important than the objective
pursuit of knowledge. Future voters are more valuable than future thinkers. See generally Paul
M. Weyrich, The Islamic School Book Controversy, Apr. 9, 2003,
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCommetary.asp?Page=%5CCommentary%5Carchive%5C20030
4%5CCOM20030409c.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008). See also AFTER POLITICAL
CORRECTNESS: THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIETY IN THE 1990S (Christopher Newfield & Ronald
Strickland eds., 1995). In some universities, it is sport to attack mainstream American values.
American capitalism is seen as a form of savagery rather than a creator of prosperity for the
greatest number. War is always wrong when undertaken by America, but never criticized when
its enemies engage in it. Guns, Christianity, and the belief in the traditional family are all indi-
cators of the intolerance and moral degeneration of American society, while Hollywood ob-
scenities that masquerade as art, the mutilation of women by the indigenous practices of foreign
cultures, and the beheading of innocent people are all acceptable practices because they take
place elsewhere. The lunatic belief that the Bush Administration was complicit in 9/11 is an-
other illustration of the disinformation that cascades within the academic and entertainment
left. The critique generally becomes diatribe- a unilateral and unfair evaluation. The oppo-
nents of the United States are always more persuasive than our own public officials who take
pride in, and defend, our country. See, e.g., Bill Lind, The Origins of Political Correctness,
www.academia.org/lectures/lindl.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008); Philip Atkinson, Political Cor-
rectness, www.ourciviisation.com/pc.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2008); ANTHONY BROWNE, THE
RETREAT OF REASON: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC DEBATE
IN MODERN BRITAIN (2006); OUR COUNTRY, OUR CULTURE: THE POLITICS OF POLITICAL
CORRECTNESS (Edith Kurzweil & William Phillips eds., 1995). This approach, which is more
widespread than is tolerable or fair, betrays the trust that tenured professors owe students and
their families. Though the students who suffer these systems are often bright enough to learn
on their own, they are deprived in substantial part of the benefit of the original bargain for intel-
lectual development and analytical understanding, which are the essential offerings of educa-
tion.
26. See EUGEN WEBER, 2 THE WESTERN TRADITION: FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE
PRESENT (5th ed. 1995); EUGEN WEBER, 1 THE WESTERN TRADITION: FROM THE ANCIENT
WORLD TO LOUIS XIV (5th ed. 1995); Eugene Weber, The Western Tradition (WGBH Boston
television broadcast 1989), available at www.learner.org/resources/series58.html (last visited
Apr. 9, 2008) [hereinafter The Western Tradition].
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ries" Venice and Amsterdam were the centers of European com-
mercial activity and development. London, comparatively speaking,
emerged more slowly as a trading city. Eventually, England would
become known as the "nation of shopkeepers."'2 The birth of a com-
mercial class in society represented a landmark event that would alter
the distribution of power and promote a new image of humanity
grounded in peace and prosperity. Competition would shift in part
from a military landscape to the higher, less turbulent plains of capital
markets and urbane culture.
In his discussion, Professor Weber emphasized the striking con-
trast between the dynastic policies of European princes and the pro-
tocol and practices of the mercantile class °.3 The royals responded to,
and exacerbated, religious divisions among peoples and countries in
order to engage in war, thereby enhancing the appearance of their
omnipotence. Financiers and traders avoided the assault on belief
systems then in vogue, deeming it transitory and counterproductive in
a business environment. Merchants did make money from the politi-
cal exploits of princes by providing them with capital to conduct mili-
tary campaigns. Mercantile activities, however, had a much wider,
longer, and more creative scope. Loans and insurance were made
available for all types of adventures and projects, near and far. In ef-
fect, through its private activity, the merchant class established urban
and regional economic centers and financial practices that at least ri-
valed, and supplanted to a degree, the State and its hegemony. 1 Both
government and the people needed money to pursue their ambitions
and build a more productive existence. Those who supplied the oper-
ating capital became vital and, therefore, very powerful. Succinctly
stated, merchants put hate and political bickering to the side and con-
centrated on profit.
Desisting from political wrangles was the first characteristic of
the nascent merchant class. Additionally, it was transborder in char-
acter." The centers of European commerce reached out to one an-
other and to the existing global marketplace. Capitalism, almost in-
trinsically, had an international reach. The betterment of self and
27. See The Western Tradition, supra note 26, Lecture No. 24: The National Monarchies. In
the following account, I have interpreted Professor Weber's lecture at various points.
28. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 253 (T. Nelson and Sons 1884) (1776).
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station had universal appeal. Political boundaries were not a signifi-
cant or limiting factor to the enterprise. Although the commercial
centers competed for international business, they also reinforced each
other in self-interested cooperation. Everyone who contributed to
the transaction could share in the profits it yielded. Commercial val-
ues were defined and prevailed. The private agreement was the pri-
mary source of regulation.33
A third and final attribute of the merchant class and its endeav-
ors was the development of a rich community culture and a pervasive
ethic of tolerance.34 These aspects contrasted sharply with the need of
princes to control people and events and to glorify their own person-
alities in an unending quest to maintain power. As commercial activi-
ties increased, trade practices became more sophisticated and the en-
vironment in which business was conducted gained importance. The
bankers in Venice left their benches and created arcades or galleries
in which to conduct their transactions." Trading companies were
formed and the selling of shares and payment of dividends provided
the supply of necessary capital, enhanced profitability, and distributed
the risk of commercial ventures over a larger group.36 Amsterdam so-
lidified its standing as the frontispiece of mercantile capitalism by
constructing magnificent buildings and sponsoring cultural events and
sophisticated forms of entertainment.
With wealth came culture-art museums, splendid public gar-
dens, and grandiose architectural structures to maintain-which at-
tracted even more business.37 The trading cities were cosmopolitan
and practiced tolerance. Entrepreneurs needed to be free to engage
in their transactions, engage in trade, move capital, and follow their
instincts on the market. They required the freedom to do as they
pleased in the context of their enterprises, to take the risk of realizing
their full potential, and to be creative in their pursuit of wealth.
Averseness to external regulation was present at the very inception of
mercantile activity. Individual liberty was not a political ideal, but a
remarkable boon of business necessity. In effect, the yearning for
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was to maintain the order required by social stability and avoid the
disruption of the marketplace by the untoward, unnecessary, or even
impolitic use of force.' The impact of piracy, which has resurfaced in
the contemporary age, upon maritime interests illustrates the useful
role of government in the conduct of national and global business.
The hijacking of ships and cargo raised substantially the cost of trans-
portation and made transactions less tenable and efficient. It further
compromised consumer interests and lessened prosperity by reducing
economic activity. General security is necessary to the conduct of
business. Making money, in effect, defanged controversies about be-
liefs and harnessed human instincts, thereby erecting a basis for the
cooperative intersection of self-interests.41 Wealth-creation competed
with historical immortality for the energies of humankind.
In sum, freedom of action is a hallmark of commercial activity.
Entrepreneurial commerce generates prosperity and thereby benefits
the larger community. Commercially vibrant communities are attrac-
tive places to live and establish businesses. It goes without saying,
however, that commerce has its own blemishes and imperfections.42
The conduct of business is a competitive, sometimes ruthless, enter-
prise; the anxieties of risk-taking can lead to ugly, and even illicit, be-
haviors. Transactions can generate conflicts and problems between
partners and result in failure.43 In contrast to political activity, where
the most primal instincts of the human personality are dominant,
commerce embodies a view of humanity that is more balanced be-
tween instinct and civilization, that draws as much, if not more, en-
ergy from the latter than the former. Humanity acting in its role as a
merchant is less prone to destructiveness and, ironically, is less driven
by avarice. Commercial competition needs others, and business be-
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. See, e.g., AVINASH K. DIxrr & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE
COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1993); LOREN FOX,
ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL (2002); ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO AND THE
DEATH OF ENRON (2002); Ameet Sachdev, Unbowed Black Gets 6 1/2 Years, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
11, 2007, at 1 (discussing Ex-Sun-Times chief who was ordered to forfeit $6.1 million in fraud
proceedings); Martha Stewart Will Pay $195K To Settle Civil Insider Trading Charges with SEC,
COURTTV.coM, Aug. 7, 2006, http://www.courttv.com/trials/stewart/080706_ap.html (last vis-
ited March 25, 2008) (explaining that Martha Stewart had to pay about $195,000 and became
ineligible to act as the director of a public company for five years under a settlement on civil
insider trading charges with the Securities and Exchange Commission).
43. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAW FIRM BREAKUPS: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
GRABBING AND LEAVING (1990); ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY:
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF PARTNER WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS (2d ed. 1998).
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comes, in effect, a way of life for entire communities. Difficulties fu-
eled by unrelenting antagonism are resolved not by military force but
by the urge to discover workable solutions to conflict.
In its purest form, commercial behavior is simultaneously self-
centered and other-regarding. The world need not be conquered, but
can be accommodated through pragmatic exchanges, creative adapta-
tions, and workable solutions. Profit and prosperity demand that
business parties seek broad-gauged, constructive dispute resolution
that maintains the participants' dignity, preserves goods and property,
and proffers a basis for continued relations. As a general proposition,
when humanity practices commerce, it exhibits more responsible and
mature behavior. Politics and other adversarial struggles are based
upon infantile perceptions, conflicts, and aspirations. In these set-
tings, the contest is a singular undertaking, the conflicts involve life-
and-death stakes, and the would-be resolution must be completely
fulfilling to the one winning party. They reflect the love-hate dilem-
mas that characterize early existence.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PURSUANT TO THE BUSINESS
ETHIC
Merchants have never much prized adversarial litigation as a
means of dispute resolution." The features of the process respond to
political values and convictions. Instead of a public proceeding with
results reflecting lay views, merchants prefer a confidential and expert
process. The politically commanded form of adjudication is ill-suited
and impractical for the resolution of commercial disagreements.45
Merchants want those disagreements resolved by other, equally
knowledgeable merchants who apply trade practices and respect the
expectations of the marketplace. Simple commercial sense argues
strongly against subjecting commercial interests to the risk of court-
room theatrics. 6 Jurors constitute one evident problem; lawyers and
judges-who are versed principally, if not exclusively, in the law-
44. See generally ERIC HELLAND & ALEXANDER TABARROK, JUDGE AND JURY:
AMERICAN TORT LAW ON TRIAL 2 (2006); Klaus Peter Berger, Lex Mercatoria and Lawyers-
Moving Away From Traditional Legal Theory, OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE, Feb.
2004, available at http://tldb.uni-koeln.de/php/ogemid.php?page=ogemid.php (last visited Apr.
10, 2008); ALAN STITT, MEDIATING COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2003); KARL MACKIE, DAVID
MILES, & WILLIAM MARSH, COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: AN ADR PRACTICE GUIDE
(2000).
45. See generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 1-5.
46. See id.
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another.4 ' Remaking commercial problems into legal issues is dan-
gerous.48 It could lead to ill-adapted judicial outcomes, far removed
from mercantile realities.
Accordingly, the merchant class' proclivity for freedom and tol-
erance brought about a need for self-administered, adapted justice.
Party negotiations, obviously, should prevail if possible.4 9 Third-
parties could assist the disagreeing parties in reaching an accommoda-
tion."0 In situations in which the disputes were unresponsive to these
efforts and involved large sums of money or were otherwise critical,
final and binding adjudication was the only means of unraveling the
impasse. Arbitration had always been attractive to the business com-
munity." Unlike court proceedings, it achieved many commercially
desirable objectives.52 Arbitrators are appointed by the parties and
are generally commercial people with a good understanding of the
trade and party dealings. Their experience and expertise allow them
to render decisions that reflect commercial exigencies. Procedural
maneuvers do not dictate the outcome. The fate of a commercial bar-
gain should not turn upon advocacy's traps and ambushes. In an eco-
nomic and disciplined proceeding, the arbitrators give each party a
reasonable opportunity to address allegations and to make their case.
Once the evidence is in place and final statements have been made,
the arbitrators deliberate and render a succinct determination. Ap-
peal of the ruling is available only upon truly exceptional grounds
that betoken procedural corruption or another form of injustice. 3
The bargain for arbitration is for a reasonably fair but expedited ad-
judicatory proceeding and a binding expert determination. Disputes
should not fester and their resolution linger. 4 Protracted, obdurate
adjudication squanders limited resources and valuable opportunities.
There is even a risk of losing the contest.5 The trade will not wait for
otherwise occupied business parties.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See sources cited supra note 44.
50. See id.
51. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2.
52. Id. at 1.
53. See id. at 30-33.
54. See id. at 2.
55. See id.
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These features of arbitration are well-established and have been
well-documented 6 Expertise, efficiency, and effectiveness in dispute
resolution suit the commercial spirit. What is new about arbitration is
its enhanced scope of application." In fact, arbitration's new jurisdic-
tional reach portends a new standing and systemic function for the
process. Broader application, however, brings new hazards and is not
necessarily likely to be accompanied by arbitration's traditional seam-
less remedial success." On the domestic side, thanks to the rulings of
the U.S. Supreme Court,59 arbitration escaped its commercial isola-
tion and spread to all areas of civil dispute resolution.60 With the
Court's enthusiastic blessing, it began to be applied in disparate-party
transactions and to the resolution of public law controversies.6' In ef-
fect, consumers and employees were required to arbitrate by manu-
facturers and employers. Compulsory recourse to arbitration gener-
ated criticism and brought about challenges to the enforceability of
arbitration agreements. Some groups perceived the displacement of
judicial authority in adjudication as an untoward use of contract
power. Despite the manifest failings of the judicial process, critics
saw the use of arbitration as an intrusion upon the public mandate
and its unilateral imposition a fundamental unfairness. Political turf
is not easily surrendered or readily shared and distortions abound
when ideologies clash.
Internationally, arbitration also superseded its traditional status
as a private legal system for Euro-American commercial transac-
tions.63 It extended its reach to all multinational commercial disputes
56. There are now comprehensive bibliographic guides to the literature in the area. The
volume of the literature has grown exponentially. See, e.g., HANS SMIT & VRATISLAV
PECHOTA, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION-AN INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 2002).
57. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 248-95, 305-51.
58. See id.
59. The Supreme Court has decided more than 35 cases dealing with arbitration in the past
55 years, beginning with Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, in 1953, to its most recent decision, Buck-
eye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
60. Id.
61. The arbitrability of statutory rights is evidenced in the Supreme Court's statement that,
"'we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the
competence of arbitral tribunals' should inhibit enforcement of the act 'in controversies based
on statutes."' Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (citing Mit-
subishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985)).
62. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
63. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-14 (1972). See also Elizabeth
Jackson, Recent Development, The Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses under MIS Bre-
men v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 377 (2001).
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and became a mechanism for processing commercial claims with sov-
ereign parties.6' Further, arbitration attenuated the commercial con-
sequences of political revolutions and changes of political regime.65
Finally, it made global business possible between Western parties and
emerging States and countries that embrace different political ideolo-
gies and legal traditions.'
See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). See also Gail Elaine Papermaster, Note,
Will the Courts Scherk the Little Old Lady in Dubuque? The Impact of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
on the Individual Investor in a Global Securities Market, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 129 (1985).
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). See also,
e.g., Charles H. Brower II, Mitsubishi, Investor-State Arbitration, and the Law of State Immunity,
20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 907 (2005); Lisa M. Ferri, Note, Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims Aris-
ing from International Commercial Disputes Recognized Under Federal Arbitration Act, 17
SETON HALL L. REV. 448, 471-72 (1987); Ronald E. M. Goodman, Note, Arbitrability and Anti-
trust: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 655,
655-56 (1985).
See also Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533-39 (1995).
See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Clark, Note, Foreign Arbitration Clauses and Foreign Forum Selections
Clauses in Bills of Lading Governed by COGSA: Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky
Reefer, 1996 BYU L. REV. 483, 489-94 (1996); Stuart C. Gauffreau, Note, Foreign Arbitration
Clauses in Maritime Bills of Lading: The Supreme Court's Decision in Vimar Seguros Y Rease-
guros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 395,411 (1996).
64. See Barton Legum, Lessons Learned from the NAFTA: The New Generation of U.S.
Investment Treaty Arbitration Provisions, 19 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 344,344-
48 (2004); Sophie Lemaire, Treaty Claims et Contract Claims: la compdtence du CIRDI d P
preuve de la dualit6 de l'Etat, [2006] REVUE L'ARBITRAGE 353; Julian D.M. Lew, ICSID Arbi-
tration: Special Features and Recent Developments, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
DISPUTES 267 (Norbert Horn & Stefan KrOll, eds. 2004); Ucheora Onwuamaegbu, The Role of
ADR in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The ICSID Experience, NEWS FROM ICSID, Winter
2005, at 12-14; Giorgio Sacerdoti, Investment Arbitration Under ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules:
Prerequisites, Applicable Law, Review of Awards, 19 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J.
1, 3-34 (2004); Ole Spiermann, Individual Rights, State Interests and the Power to Waive ICSID
Jurisdiction under Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 ARB. INT'L 179 (2004).
65. See Bernard Audit, Les "Accords" d'Alger du 19 janvier 1981 tendant au riglement des
difflrends entre les Etats-Unis et L'Iran, 108 J. DE DROIT INT'L "CLUNET" 713 (1981);
RAHMATULLAH KHAN, THE IRAN - UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, CONTROVERSIES,
CASES AND CONTRIBUTIONS (1990); THE IRAN - UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-
1983, 104-35 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1984).
66. See Michael Moser, China - Hong Kong Enforcement Arrangement Becomes Effective,
15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 24, 24-28 (2000); Vratislav Pechota, China International Eco-
nomic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), 4 WORLD ARB. REP. 4315 (2000); Le
Cong Dinh, Arbitration in Vietnam, 11 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 164, 167 (2000); Komar Mu-
lyana & Jan K. Schaefer, Indonesia's New Framework for International Arbitration: A Critical
Assessment of the Law and Its Application by the Courts, 17 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 39
(2002); Vincent Godbillon, La Problmatique Actuelle de I'Arbitrage Commercial International
Russe, 17 BULL. SWISS ARB. ASS'N 285 (1999).
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The success of arbitration in each of these new sectors has been,
and may continue to be, variable.6" The imperative for arbitration be-
tween North American and European parties may not be so un-
equivocal in other contexts that are influenced by a multitude of dif-
ferent considerations. In the North American-European sector,
without a willingness and ability to arbitrate, parties could only en-
gage in self-help or have recourse to municipal court litigation.68 The
latter approaches are inapposite because each of them represents an
expensive means to a generally ineffective end.69 In this regional sec-
tor, arbitration facilitates trade by supplying a workable international
trial system-a trial process that is neutral, expert, reasonably effi-
cient, effective, and final. The success of international arbitration is
also due to its autonomy from domestic regulatory authority.7"
Transborder arbitration is not as popular or effective where par-
ties' differences outweigh their shared dispositions, and where com-
peting interests are less malleable, the work of arbitration is more dif-
ficult and likely to be an approximation. For example, during the last
fifteen years, many Latin American countries have endorsed interna-
tional commercial arbitration. Many of them have adopted the
UNCITRAL Model Law7 2 as a symbol of their commitment to the ef-
fective future application of the process. The reality of implementa-
tion, however, may be less than the impression conveyed by the ad-
67. After its initial success, CIETAC arbitration has "cooled" considerably because of
problems with the integrity of arbitrators. The Argentine response to the enforceability of
ICSID awards will be critical to the continued recourse to arbitration in Latin American coun-
tries. See Carlos E. Alfaro & Pedro M. Lorenti, The Growing Opposition of Argentina to ICSID
Arbitral Tribunals: A Conflict Between International and Domestic Law?, 6 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT & TRADE 417 (2005).
68. See Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, supra note 3, at 1187-94.
69. Id.
70. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 430-31.
71. See NIGEL BLACKABY, DAVID M. LINDSEY, & ALESSANDRO SPINILLO,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA (2003); Jean Kalicki, ICSID Arbitration in
the Americas, supra note 12; Michael T. Sprague, Comment, A Courageous Course for Latin
America: Urging the Ratification of the ICSID, 5 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 157 (1983) (advocating the
ratification of the ICSID Convention by Latin American countries).
72. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL]
MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1985) (amended 2006), avail-
able at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/englishltexts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf (last
visited Apr. 11, 2008). To date, four Latin American countries have enacted new national legis-
lation on arbitration based on the Model Law. Several other Latin American countries have
passed new arbitration laws that incorporate the Model Law but with emendations. See JAN
KLEINHEISTERKAMP, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA
(2005); Horacio A. Grigera Na6n, Arbitration and Latin America: Progress and Setbacks, 21
ARB. INT'L 127 (2005).
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hering rhetoric because a system granting full faith and credit to arbi-
tral awards has yet to materialize. 3 The Japanese response to arbitra-
tion also illustrates the lukewarm international reception of the proc-
ess.74  Despite its significant commercial position and modern
legislation on arbitration, Japan is a less-than-enthusiastic proponent
of the process. Its history and cultural sentiments point to mediation
as the preferred remedy for resolving disputes. In fact, arbitration in
Japan sometimes resembles mediation. 76 Though international arbi-
tral awards are fully enforceable in Japan, and Japanese companies
do participate in arbitrations, this conduct may well be a pragmatic
concession to Western business interests rather than an acceptance of
arbitration as an effective method of dispute resolution.77
Of the Asian countries, Singapore is the jurisdiction most hospi-
table to the Western consensus on arbitration.78 It has established an
arbitration center that provides administrating services and promotes
business recourse to the Western process. China has its own form of
institutional arbitration, CIETAC,7 which represents a real, albeit
modest, concession to the global practice of arbitration. The Chinese
government appears unwilling to recognize an external process. It
would rather convert its prior trade regulation bureaucracy into a
Westernized adjudicatory process, operating on its territory and ulti-
mately subject to its political control. Even communist dictatorships
in transformative evolution are unwilling to forgo advantage. The
73. See KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 72; Na6n, supra note 72, at 172-76.
74. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 363 (2005); see David A. Livdahl & Asako Yamagami, Arbi-
tration in Japan, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ASIA 137-200 (Philip J.
Mcconnaughay & Thomas B. Ginsburg eds., 2d ed. 2006); David J. Przeracki, Note, "Working it
Out ": A Japanese Alternative to Fighting It Out, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 149, 164 (1989).
75. Przeracki, supra note 74, at 156-60, 163-66.
76. Id.
77. See Livdahl & Yamagami, supra note 74; Przeracki, supra note 74, at 159-60 (compar-
ing Western law in Japan to an "heirloom sword" which is taken out and shown to outsiders but
never actually used).
78. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 286 (2007).
79. See, e.g., Cedric C. Chao & James Schurz, International Arbitration: Selecting the Proper
Forum, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., Feb. 2007, at 17; Sally A. Harpole, Factors Affecting the
Growth (or Lack Thereof) of Arbitration in the Asia Region, 20 J. INT'L ARB. 89 (2003); Huang
Yanming, The Ethics of Arbitrators in CIETAC Arbitrations, 12 J. INT'L ARB. 5 (1995);
SELECTED WORKS OF CHINA INTENATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION
COMMISSION AWARDS (Priscilla Leung Mei-fun & Wang Sheng-chang, eds., 1998); Pechota,
supra note 66, at 4315; Wang Sheng-chang, Practical Aspects of Foreign-Related Arbitration in
China, in ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN 45 (1997).
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standing of Hong Kong in terms of international commercial arbitra-
tion remains to be defined and clarified. 80
By far, the Arab countries are the least hospitable jurisdictions to
international commercial arbitration for a variety of political and reli-
gious reasons.1 Saudi Arabia,8 despite its ratification of the New
York Arbitration Convention and other similar international instru-
ments, 3 is in effect quite hostile to Western transborder arbitration.
Iran recently ratified the New York Arbitration Convention, " but the
current regime possesses a knee-jerk antagonism to anything Western
or non-Muslim. Repressive and oppressive governments are unlikely
to foster the conduct of global business. Tentative accommodations
are often reached for reasons of necessity and with the hope of even-
tual amelioration or extinction.
ARBITRATION AND POLITICS
Under U.S. law, arbitration has a statutorily-recognized impact
upon sovereign status. According to the "arbitration exception 85 to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, sovereign status can-
80. See Mark Lin, Enforcement of Mainland China's Arbitral Awards in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region After 1 July 1997, 65 ARB.: J. CHARTERED INST. ARB. 56 (1999);
Robert Morgan, The Arbitration Act 1996 and Arbitration Law Reform in Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore: A Brave New World?, 1997 ARB. & DISP. RESOL. L.J. 177, 177 (1997).
81. CARBONNEAU, supra note 74, at 365.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The New York Arbitration Convention entered into force on January 13, 2002 in Iran.
Status of UNCITRAL Conventions and Model Laws, www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.convent-
ions.membership.statusfun.arbitration.recognition.and.enforcement.conventin.new.york. 1958.h
tml (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or the of the States in any case
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign
state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differ-
ences which have arisen or which may arise between the parties with respect to a de-
fined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable
of settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award
made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitration, if (A) the arbitration takes place or
is intended to take place in the United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be
governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States
calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, (C) the underlying claim,
save for the agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in a United Sates court
under this section or section 1607, or (D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise
applicable.
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2000).
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not block the enforcement of an arbitration agreement or award.
Once a State enters into an arbitration agreement, it waives its sover-
eign immunity from suit and execution and consents, as a matter of
law, to the jurisdiction of the court to achieve enforcement.' The
federal policy on arbitration demands the removal of barriers to arbi-
tration no matter what their basis in law might be. U.S. law provides
that the only parties who benefit from immunity in the context of ar-
bitration are the arbitrators and the arbitral service-providers.87
Arbitration's direct role in the resolution of commercial disputes
that arise from, and implicate, sovereign interests and policies is a vo-
cation-in-the-making. Because disputes with a political element tend
to be imperturbable, arbitration's resolutory performance (as noted
earlier 8 ) has been more tentative and less spectacular. The Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal 9 was the first contemporary experi-
ment with arbitration in politicized areas. More than a decade later,
it was followed by the less-significant Iraqi War Claims Commission.'
The latter's mission was compromised by a would-be lack of oil reve-
nues. The Iran-United States Tribunal was more remarkable because
there were monetary resources for its operation and satisfaction of
orders for compensation. The funding came from the worldwide
freezing of Iranian assets, one of the crowning achievements of the
Carter Administration. The Tribunal was intended to allow private
companies and individuals to seek compensation for the commercial
losses they suffered as a result of the Iranian revolution.9' It also al-
lowed the adverse State parties to confront each other on the ques-
tion of compensation and other matters.' It may have been the first
86. See id.
87. See David J. Branson & Richard E. Wallace, Jr., Immunity of Arbitrators under United
States Law, in THE IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATORS 85 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1990); see also, e.g.,
Martin Domke, The Arbitrator's Immunity from Liability: A Comparative Survey, 3 U. TOL. L.
REV. 99 (1971); Mark W. Levine, The Immunity of Arbitrators and the Duty to Disclose, 6 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 197 (1995); Richard J. Mattera, Has the Expansion of Arbitral Immunity
Reached Its Limits After United States v. City of Hayward?, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 779
(1997); Andrea Mettler, Immunity v. Liability in Arbitral Adjudication, 47 ARB. J. 24, 26 (1992);
Michael D. Moberly, Immunizing Arbitrators from Claims for Equitable Relief, 5 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L. J. 325 (2005).
88. See sources cited supra notes 65-67.
89. See supra note 67.
90. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 464.
91. See, e.g., David P. Stewart & Laura B. Sherman, Developments at the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal: 1981-1983, in THE IRAN-US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-1983 4-5 (Richard B. Lil-
lich ed., 1984).
92. Id. at 5.
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time that a victor (who, additionally, had won on its home turf) be-
came accountable for the economic consequences of the political
strife it initiated and conducted. The rules of arbitral procedure con-
tained the violence of the political disagreement between the two
sovereign countries.93 In effect, arbitral adjudication, customized to
the incidents of sovereignty and adjusted to specific situations, pro-
vided the measure of stability and order by which to redress commer-
cial grievances and allocate compensation. The sovereigns, however,
would never have been so inclined had assets not been frozen.
States have also used arbitration to address trade regulation and
policy. Although the Disputes Settlement Body (DSB) within the
World Trade Organization (WTO),94 formerly the GAT, 95 has been
enhanced to achieve expedited coercive results, the NAFTA process96
is a vehicle of even greater transborder innovation. The WTO proce-
dures apply exclusively between sovereigns and address economic
policy disagreements between Member StatesY Despite the imposi-
tion of real procedural restraints on the processing of claims, 9s the
prospect of final enforcement of a DSB ruling often dims and eventu-
ally disappears in the haze of political temporizing. Sovereign discre-
tion, in any context, is difficult, if not impossible, to mitigate. It can-
not be eliminated. The "softwood lumber" saga99 demonstrates that
sovereignty still trumps, even though economic sanctions can (techni-
cally) be imposed by the DSB on noncomplying States. The reality of
power cannot be ignored and the effectiveness of power relationships
overstated.
From a wider systemic perspective, NAFTA complements the
WTO system by integrating affected individuals into the dispute reso-
93. See, e.g., STEWART A. BAKER & MARK DAVID DAVIS, THE UNCITRAL
ARBITRATION RULES IN PRACTICE: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL 3 (1992).
94. See, e.g., THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW/DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Petros
C. Mavrodis & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 2005).
95. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
96. See, e.g., Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365,372-73 (2003).
97. See THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW/DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note
94.
98. Id.
99. See DAOWEI ZHANG, THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER WAR: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND
THE LONG U.S.-CANADIAN TRADE DISPUTE 2-4 (2007); Chi Carmody, International Decisions-
Softwood Lumber Dispute (2001-2006), 100 AM. J. INT'L 664 (2006).
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lution process and by creating a mechanism for advisory opinions.' °
Individuals can sue an offending State directly under Chapter 11 for
alleged violations of the NAFTA Treaty. m1' Moreover, the NAFTA
partners have recourse to a type of advisory adjudicatory mechanism
in Chapter 20 for resolving trade policy disagreements.' °2 In a number
of celebrated cases, foreign claimants asserted that state laws and ju-
dicial procedures in the United States (in California and Mississippi
particularly) violated the NAFTA treaty and gave rise to a right of
compensation in the implicated commercial enterprises.' 3 The allega-
tions generated a firestorm of protest within the United States.14
Opponents asserted that international attorneys acting as adjudica-
tors in a distant, elusive, and unaccountable transnational framework
could, in effect, impose a commercial tax on the operation of democ-
ratic government. In each case, the foreign company's claim and po-
sition was both real and credible.' State legislative prohibition of a
fuel additive, for example, diminished considerably a Canadian com-
pany's business and reduced the profitability of the enterprise.""
Moreover, the recourse to a Mississippi jury to resolve a commercial
100. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 74, at 385-88; Marcia J. Staff & Christine W. Lewis, Ar-
bitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Past, Present, and Future, 25 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 301, 304-08
(2003).
101. See RALPH FOLSOM ET AL., HANDBOOK OF NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 2-18
(1998); LEON E. TRAKMAN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE NAFTA: MANUAL AND
SOURCE BOOK (1997); JOSEPH A. MCKINNEY, CREATED FROM NAFTA 223-24 (2000); Asha
Kaushal, Reconciling the Public Interest: Third Party Participation, Confidentiality and Privacy
in NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 9 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 172, 172 (2006).
102. MCKINNEY, supra note 101, at 28-30.
103. See Loewen Group, Inc. and Loewen v. U.S., (Can. v. U.S.), 7 ICSID Rep. 442, 42
I.L.M. 811, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (2003); Memorandum Opinion of the U.S. Dist. Ct.
Dismissing Loewen's Petition to Vacate Arbitral Award, In re Arbitration Between Loewen v.
U.S., No. 04-2151 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2005); Methanex Corp. v. U.S. (Can. v. U.S.), IIC 167
(UNCITRAL/NAFTA Ad Hoc Tribunal 2005), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/
IIC_167_(2005).pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2008); Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (U.S. v. Mex.), IIC
161, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000), available at www.investmentclaims.com/IIC 161
(2000).pdf.
104. See Public Citizen, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Cases: Bankrupting Democracy
(2001), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF186.PDF; New Study Analyzes Seven Years of
Corporate Investor Challenges to Democratic Governance under NAFTA,
www.organicconsumers.org/Corp/DolanReport.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
105. Some commentators argue that the Chapter 11 cases do not constitute a coherent deci-
sional law with clear and fixed legal rules on the propriety of State regulation of regional com-
mercial conduct. Critics see the Chapter 11 cases as an infringement of State sovereignty, but
that assessment is almost undeniably an exaggeration meant to fuel a political agenda. See Staff
& Lewis, supra note 100, at 328-29.
106. See Methanex, IIC 167 at 1, 26.
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claim against another Canadian corporation violated, in all likelihood,
due process of law and treaty obligations in light of the jury's track
record in favor of plaintiffs. °7
Especially in the fuel additive case, by considering whether the
company was entitled to compensation,' °8 NAFTA tribunals recog-
nized-perhaps for the first time in an adjudicatory context-that
States could be held responsible for the commercial consequences of
their regulatory decisions. Political authority could be exercised for
the public, but not without private accountability. The economic im-
pact of regulatory law could be effectively determined and measured.
The cases provoked a vehement outcry among ideological groups.
The protests "encouraged" reconsideration of preliminary determina-
tions and even the allegiance to the transborder investment regime.' °9
The criticisms threatened to undermine the independence and legiti-
macy of NAFTA arbitration. In fact, some commentators suggested
that NAFTA arbitrators should have less of a commercial vintage and
be more "politically experienced" so that more "suitable" results
could be reached."' In politics, ornamentation is everything; the abil-
ity to obfuscate and make grandiose but vacuous statements is a veri-
table art form. Succinctly stated, NAFTA is not a concession by po-
litical actors to commercial interests. It is effective only when its
procedures and results fit the political convenience of the circum-
stances. The opportunity to encircle political will with the rule of law
appears to have been lost.
The reference in NAFTA and in Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs)'11 to ICSID arbitration revitalized World Bank arbitration and
107. See Loewens, IIC 254. See also William S. Dodge, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States
and Mondev International Ltd. v. United States, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 155, 156-57 (2004); Emmanuel
Gaillard, 'Loewen v. U.S.A.': New Ground in NAFTA/1CSID Arbitration, N.Y. L.J. Apr. 5,
2001, at 3.
108. See Methanex, IIC 167. In Metalclad v. Mexico (U.S. v. Mex.), IIC 161, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000), for example, the U.S. investor brought a Chapter 11 action against
Mexico because the government of a Mexican state refused to issue a construction permit to
allow it to reopen a waste disposal facility. The tribunal ordered Mexico to compensate Meta-
clad for its investment loss (the purchase of a Mexican company which owned the site). Critics
saw the determination as a violation of State sovereignty over environmental regulations. See
Staff & Lewis, supra note 100, at 322.
109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
110. Interview with Armand de Mestral, NAFTA arbitrator, in McGill Law Faculty, Mont-
real, Quebec, Canada (Summer 2005).
111. See Antonio R. Parra, ICSID and Bilateral Investment Treaties, NEWS FROM ICSID
(ICSID, Washington D.C.), Spring 2000, at 11; Eduardo Savarese, Investment Treaties and the
Investor's Right to Arbitration between Broadening and Limiting ICSID Jurisdiction, 7 J.
WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 407, 410 (2006); Margrete Stevens, Experience in Arbitrations
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gave it a chance at a new day."2 In fact, ICSID arbitration is currently
the primary mechanism for adjudicating foreign investment claims in-
volving Latin American countries." The arbitrations involve volatile
political claims arising out of commercial contracts and transactions.
Foreign investors seek to develop and commercialize the natural re-
sources of the host State; the natural resources can range from water
and oil to minerals and lumber."4 While a private contracting party is
not entitled to modify a contract unilaterally without liability, the cir-
cumstances of conducting a commercial transaction between a West-
ern party and a developing State agency or government involving
would-be patrimonial interests may alter or eliminate that settled
principle of contract law. Although ICSID tribunals may apply stan-
dard legal rules in reaching their determinations, it remains to be seen
whether their rulings will be "accepted" by the foreign State against
which they are rendered."5
The systematic use of arbitral adjudication to address politicized
commercial disputes in the world community is novel and proffers
hope for establishing the stability necessary for future global prosper-
ity. As noted at the outset of the discussion, the utility of arbitration
in this area is far removed from its accomplishments in international
commercial litigation among private parties. Political actors believe
in the cultivation of advantage (through alliances, disinformation, or
under ICSID Rules Pursuant to Bilateral Investment Treaties, 29 INT'L Bus. LAW. 377, 377
(2001); Jeswald Salacuse, Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search for a
Grand Bargain, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 51, 69 (Norbert Horn ed.,
2004).
112. See David R. Sedlak, ICSID's Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can
the Momentum Hold? 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV 147, 149 (2004).
113. See, e.g., Gonzalo Biggs, The Latin American Treatment of International Arbitration
and Foreign Investments and the Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 19 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 61, 69 (2004); Charles Chatterjee, Investment-Related Promissory Notes Are
Investments under the ICSID Convention: Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezula, 3 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT 147 (2002); Alejandro Escobar, Bolivia Exposes 'Critical Date Ambiguity',
GLOBAL ARB. REV., June/July 2007, at 17; Francisco Gonzalez de Cossio, The International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: The Mexican Experience, 19 J. INT'L ARB. 227
(2002).
114. See sources cited supra note 112; see also Alexia Brunet & Juan Agustin Lentini, Arbi-
tration of International Oil, Gas, and Energy Disputes in Latin America, 27 NW. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 591, 591-92 (2007).
115. See, e.g., Alfaro & Lorenti, supra note 67; Enron Corporation v. Argentine Republic
(U.S. v. Arg.), IIC 292, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 (May 22, 2007); Compania De Aguas Del
Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Fr. v. Arg.), IIC 307, ICSID
Case No. ARB/97/3 (Aug. 20, 2007). See also Gus Van Harten, The Public-Private Distinction
in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims Against the State, 56 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
371,392 (2007).
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aggression). For them, arbitration provides initially a framework for
conducting discussions and, later, a possible endpoint. By contrast,
commercial parties espouse the process as a means of eliminating the
problems that impede the doing of business. Merchants see intracta-
ble positions and the generation of irremediable conflict as costly and
counterproductive. In the end, the pursuit can yield an absolute loss
for all parties. Politicians seem to thrive on conflict; it provides them
with an opportunity to defeat the other side. Political leaders take
advantage of circumstances rather than benefiting from the advan-
tages of the arbitral process. In these circumstances, arbitration can
only work if attachable assets exist or if the parties are willing or are
constrained to accept its adjudicatory discipline. A mutual self-
interest and the political will to achieve a workable result must un-
dergird arbitration as a mechanism for resolving trade policy or other
political disputes. The possibility of manipulating the process for ad-
vantage (by altering the composition of the tribunal, for example) and
the right to veto or unilaterally renegotiate the results increases arbi-
tration's appeal to political parties, but reduces its credibility and ef-
fectiveness as a functional process of adjudication that can achieve re-
sults.
CONCLUSION: ARBITRATION'S LIKELY POTENTIAL
Despite forays into the political realm, arbitration's bedrock
achievements have been in its area of origin, namely, the adjudication
of commercial claims between parties who belong to similar regional,
political, and economic systems. Arbitration establishes the legal
foundation for the conduct of business at this transborder level.
Through private arbitral trials, international business parties avoid
the competition between national courts, their conflicting perceptions
of jurisdiction, and the independence of the legal traditions they rep-
resent."6 As the pursuit of commerce gives rise to the miracle of tol-
erance, the use of arbitration allows for the accommodation of dis-
similar legal practices.' 7 The essentials of the trial can be entrusted to
116. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 74, at 353-54.
117. See THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE (Geoffery M. Beresford-Hartwell ed., 1997)
(containing the proceedings of the the 1996 International Conference of the Chartered Institute
of Arbitrators); Christian Borris, Common Law and Civil Law: Fundamental Differences and
Their Impact on Arbitration, 60 ARB.: J. CHARTERED INST. ARBS. 78 (1994); Bernardo M. Cre-
mades, Arbitration and Business, in ICCA, SIXTH INT'L ARB. CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS 77
(1978); Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, The "Americanization" of International Arbitration?,
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., Apr. 2001, at 11; Lara M. Pair, Cross-Cultural Arbitration: Do the
Differences Between Cultures Still Influence International Commercial Arbitration Despite Har-
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appointed arbitrators who will make adjustments as the proceeding
develops. To scholars or practitioners familiar with mixed legal juris-
dictions (Louisiana, Qu6bec, Puerto Rico, Scotland, and South Af-
rica), achieving a procedural and substantive consensus among these
national traditions is no less impressive than a military armistice.
'1 8
The substantial disparity in the trial paradigm as to the role of the de-
cider, the collection and evaluation of information, the use of experts
and other witnesses, and the character and form of the determination
can be reconciled through the "comparative" experience of the ap-
pointed arbitrators or through the exercise of party choice implied in
freedom of contract or by the joint action of both factors."9
In the North American-European context, the form of arbitra-
tion that emerged in the wake of World War II was based primarily
on continental and civilian trial models."' It was practiced largely by
ex-patriate firms and lawyers, along with the local foreign bar. U.S.
attorneys generally favored recourse to federal courts for resolving
international commercial claims."1 In the mid- to late 1980s, roughly
coinciding with political triumph of capitalism and the disintegration
of the Soviet Union, American international lawyers acquiesced to
the use of arbitration as the basic mechanism for the conduct of inter-
national commercial litigation. 2 U.S. participation in the European
trend, however, brought baggage-the use of American-styled trial
techniques, creating a battle for establishing the central structure of
the transborder arbitral trial. 3 The essential question focused upon
whether legal counsel or the arbitrators would control the conduct of
the proceedings. The American adversarial tradition attributed this
procedural power to the litigating attorneys whereas judges per-
formed the function in the continental civilian process. 4
monization?, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.L. 57 (2002); Gabrielle Kaufnann-Kohler, Globalization
of Arbitral Procedure, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313, 1317 (2003); Serge Lazareff, Interna-
tional Arbitration: Towards a Common Procedural Approach, in CONFLICTING LEGAL
CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS 31 (Stefan N.
Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider eds., 1999).
118. See, e.g., H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE
DIVERSITY IN LAW (3d ed. 2007).
119. The principle of pacta sunt servanda is instrumental both to international litigation and
the law of arbitration. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 78, at 299-300.
120. See generally Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, supra note 3, at 781-
82.
121. See id. at 778.
122. See id. at 778, 782.
123. See id. at 782.
124. See GLENN, supra note 118, at 230-31.
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As it has in all jurisdictions with a hybrid legal heritage, the quest
to predominate and prevail over the other legal tradition remained
active in North American-European international commercial arbi-
tration. For attorneys, the real concern was to engage in a trial for-
mat that was familiar in order to maximize the client's position and
advantages. It was also a matter in which profound cultural assump-
tions clashed125-roughly equivalent to writing a brief in the other
side's language. The battle was tempered to a considerable extent in
light of the unquestioned status of English as the language of interna-
tional business and the substantial popularity of American legal edu-
cation among foreign commercial litigators. The competition be-
tween major trial traditions also softened because of the intercession
and cultural bridging work of institutional service-providers, like the
ICC, LCIA, AAA, and Stockholm Chamber of Commerce."6 The in-
stitutions supplied arbitrators with the support necessary to reach
considered determinations and accommodations on this issue. Fi-
nally, as noted earlier,1" parties could arrive at their own solutions
when they negotiated the arbitral clause.
As Newman and Zaslowsky have argued, '28 arbitral institutions
should provide multinational parties with a choice of trial options at
the early stage of the process. This practice would avoid surprise and
would also allow parties to delegate the task of determination to the
arbitrators. It might be useful to provide parties who disagree or are
likely to disagree with a trial model that integrates the basic features
of both the adversarial and inquisitorial trial systems. For example,
given the absence of a jury and the arbitrators' experience and exper-
tise, the rules for gathering and weighing evidence could be relaxed
and arbitrators given a greater role in ordering and conducting dis-
covery. Expert witnesses, as is now the case, 29 could be required to
125. See id.
126. Id. at 368-69.
127. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
128. See Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, Cultural Predictability in International
Arbitration, N.Y. L.J., May 25, 2004, at 3, reprinted in CARBONONNEAU, supra note 74, at 493.
129. See PROTOCOL FOR THE USE OF PARTY-APPOINTED EXPERT WITNESSES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Chartered Institute of Arbitrators), available at
http://www.lcia.org/CONF folder/documents/PeterReesProtocolfortheUseofExpertWitnessesin
InternationalArbitration.DOC (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).; David Howell, Use of Experts In
International Arbitration, ASIAN DISP. REv., Apr. 2005, available at http://www.fulbright.com
iages/publications/use%20of %20experts%20in%20international%20arbitrationdjh%20-2_.pdf;
THE EXPERT IN LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (D. Mark Cato ed., 1999); Doug Jones, Use of
Experts in Arbitration; Independent Experts- The Common Law Approach, TRANSNAT'L Disp.
MANAG., Nov. 2005, at 2, 17.
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testify together and engage in a colloquy with the arbitrators under
the supervision of counsel. Live testimony should not be discouraged
or presumptively displaced by written evidence. Cross-examination
of witnesses should be an accepted feature of the arbitral trial, along
with a verbatim record of the proceedings if only to act as a means of
supplying the tribunal with accurate information.3 '
After many years of formative churning, the development of ar-
bitration in the North American-European sector has reached a pla-
teau of uniformity and consensus demanded by its application in a re-
gion with an integrated sense of history, culture, and values.'
Uncertainty, however, resides in transplanting the process into other
regional areas of the global economy and having it apply in politicized
circumstances that involve sovereign parties and mixed conflicts.
Emerging and reemerging countries in Eastern Europe, the former
Soviet Union, and Latin America rightly see their future in global
commerce and understand that transborder arbitration is the "sup-
porting beam" of the world marketplace. Even the remaining
staunchly communist regimes, like China and Vietnam (with the pos-
sible exception of Cuba), recognize the necessity of global commerce
and how vital arbitration is to its existence. 132 Whether antagonisms
and political and religious diversity can be corralled to achieve com-
mercial prosperity and override the antipathies and bloodlust of yore
remains to be seen. The voice of arbitration has a different resonance
outside the tolerant confines of the North American-European trad-
ing city, but it is whispering the tune of a more rational and tolerant
destiny for humankind.
130. See Paul D. Friedland, Combining Civil Law and Common Law Elements in the Presen-
tation of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., Sept.
1997, at 25, 28; see also Peter R. Griffin, Recent Trends in the Conduct of International Arbitra-
tion: Discovery Procedures and Witness Hearings, J. INT'L ARB., March 2000, at 28-29.
131. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 74, at 362.
132. See Lucy V. Katz, How International Arbitration Bridges Global Markets in Transition
Economies, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF LITIG. (CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution,
New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2004, at 145 available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-
bin/fulltext/109609872/PDFSTART; Magnus Andrrn, Enforcement of an Arbitral Award in the
People's Republic of China, STOCKHOLM ARB. REP., 2000, at 73; John Mo, Probing the Uni-
formity of the Arbitration System in the PRC, J. INT'L ARB., May 2000, at 1; Pip Nicholson &
Nguyen Thi Minh, Commercial Disputes and Arbitration in Vietnam, J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 2000,
at 1.
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